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 FOREWORD 
 
The output from the European inspection qualification process is generally a statement 
concluding whether or not there is high confidence that the required inspection capability will be 
achieved in practice, for the specified inspection system, component and defect range. 
However, this process does not provide a quantitative measure of inspection capability of the 
type that could be used for instance in the connection of the risk-informed in-service inspection 
(RI-ISI) process. In a quantitative RI-ISI, a quantitative measure of inspection effectiveness is 
needed in determining the risk reduction associated with inspection. 
 
The issue of linking the European qualification process and a quantitative measure of inspection 
capability has been discusses within the ENIQ (European Network for Inspection and 
Qualification) over several years. In 2005 the ENIQ Task Group on Risk decided to initiate an 
activity to address this question. A program of work was proposed to investigate and 
demonstrate an approach to providing some objective measure of the confidence which comes 
from inspection qualification, and allowing risk reduction associated with a qualified inspection to 
be calculated. The work plan focuses on following issues: 
 
• Investigating sensitivity of risk reduction to POD level and detail; 
• Investigating the use of user-defined POD curve as target for qualification; 
• Testing a Bayesian approach to quantifying output from qualification; 
• Linking qualification outcome, risk reduction and inspection interval; 
• Pilot study of overall process, including a pilot qualification board. 
 
The work is organised in a project “Link Between Risk-Informed In-Service Inspection and 
Inspection Qualification”, coordinated by Doosan Babcock, UK. The project is partly funded by a 
group of nuclear utilities. In addition, the Joint Research Centre, Institute of Energy is 
participating in the project with a significant work contribution. 
 
This report contributes to the project by addressing the investigation of the sensitivity of risk 
reduction POD level and detail. The research work has been carried out at the Joint Research 
Centre, Institute for Energy during year 2006. 
 
 
Luca Gandossi    Kaisa Simola 
Scientific Officer    Senior Research Scientist 
DG Joint Research Centre (JRC-IE)  VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland 
      (Visiting Scientist at JRC-IE 2004-2006) 
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 1 Introduction 
 
This report discusses the link between risk-informed in-service inspection (RI-ISI) and 
assumptions made concerning the probability of flaw detection. The purpose is to 
investigate the reasonable and practical requirements that should be set for 
assumptions about the accuracy of probability of detection (POD) curves from a RI-ISI 
point of view. 
 
RI-ISI aims at defining an effective inspection programme taking into account the 
probability of failure and the failure consequences. When evaluating the effectiveness 
of a RI-ISI programme, a measure of the inspection reliability is needed. The change in 
risk is affected by the assumptions made on the inspection efficiency. A basic 
assumption is that an inspection decreases the failure probability of the inspected 
component, and thus reduces the risk associated with that component. 
 
An acceptance criterion for a new inspection programme based on a RI-ISI analysis is 
typically that the safety level of the plant should be maintained or improved when 
moving from a traditional inspection programme to a risk-informed one. In some cases 
a minor risk increase may be acceptable, as in the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
regulation [1, 2]. Requirements may also be set for the risk reduction when the situation 
with no inspections at all is compared with the risk calculated accounting for the 
inspections. 
 
In various RI-ISI methodologies, the inspection reliability is taken into account in 
different ways. In the EPRI methodology, a very simple approach of using a single 
POD value to reduce the failure probability is adopted for evaluating the risk change. In 
the Swedish NURBIT code [3], full POD curves where the POD is a function of the flaw 
through-wall extent are used. The POD function can either be determined by the user 
or built-in functions based on the study of [4] can be selected. Also some other 
structural reliability models use rather detailed POD models. 
 
Even if the use of a single POD value seems to be a very coarse approach, one may 
also question the use of very detailed models, since the validity of the applied POD 
curves can easily be questioned. This report aims at studying the sensitivity of the risk 
reduction to the assumptions made about the POD function. A reasonable level of 
detail for a POD (at least for RI-ISI applications) might be to express it as a step 
function, and we have investigated especially the effect of the step function parameters 
on the risk reduction. The results of these sensitivity studies can be used to develop 
recommendations for a reasonable degree of detail for PODs. 
 
 
2 A simplified model for considering inspection reliability in 
RI-ISI 
 
As a starting point, let us set out the framework of this analysis. We consider passive 
pressure-retaining components, such as pipework and pressure vessels. We deal with 
the problem of inspecting such components (or selected parts of them, such as 
weldments, elbows, tees) with the specific aim of finding (or excluding the presence of) 
crack-like defects. We assume that we are dealing with a single degradation 
mechanism (i.e. fatigue, or intergranular stress corrosion cracking) and we exclude 
from our analysis degradation leading to volumetric defects, wall thinning, etc. 
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 We start with the analysis of a single component (for instance, one weld in a piping 
system). 
 
This component has an associated risk which is typically calculated as the product of 
the probability of failure and the consequence of failure. We limit our analysis to a 
failure that could occur because of the (possible) presence of a crack-like defect as 
specified above. 
 
In broad engineering terms, the risk is given by 
 
 Risk=pof x cof (1)
 
where pof is the probability of failure and cof the consequence of that failure, 
expressed in some sort of convenient metric.  
 
Clearly, this is not the only risk that could be associated with that single component. 
The component (along with all other components constituting the plant) will carry a total 
risk given by the sum of the risks associated with all other relevant degradation 
mechanisms, say for instance water hammer, wall thinning due to corrosion and 
earthquake. We assume that the inspection system under consideration has been 
designed to target the specific acting degradation mechanism leading to crack-like 
defects. In this framework, the inspection programme and the detection capabilities of 
the inspection system will not affect any other components of the risk except that 
expressed in Equation (1). 
 
Further, it is clear to see that the inspection programme will only affect the probability of 
failure. As an inspection is carried out, some knowledge regarding the (previously 
uncertain) state of the plant is gathered, and the probability of failure is (usually) 
reduced. If defective components are found, these are assumed to be repaired or 
removed. The consequence of failure, depending on many factors such as plant layout, 
presence of redundant or mitigating systems, etc. will not be affected by the inspection. 
It is therefore straightforward to see how the risk will change before and after an 
inspection is carried out by simply considering the change in probability of failure. 
 
Let us define a risk reduction percentage, R, as: 
 
 100)1( ⋅−=
without
with
pof
pof
R  (2)
 
where pofwithout is the probability of failure without inspection, and pofwith is the 
probability of failure with inspection. R takes values in the interval (0,100). Values of R 
close to 100 mean a significant risk reduction due to the inspection. Indeed, a perfect 
inspection (i.e. one capable of finding all defects of all sizes) will reduce the probability 
of failure pofwith to zero, and therefore R will be equal to 100. On the other hand, values 
of R close to zero mean a small change in risk, due to a poor inspection.  
 
In a detailed, fully quantitative approach to RI-ISI, one would model the inspection 
programme within a probabilistic structural integrity model. In this case, extensive 
knowledge or assumptions are needed about materials, loadings, initial crack 
distribution, crack growth behaviour, probability of detection, etc. Typically, one would 
run a MONTECARLO analysis of the problem, repeating many times over a 
deterministic structural integrity assessment, each time sampling the required input 
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 parameters from the appropriate distributions and verifying whether the structure has 
failed or is in a safe state for that particular combination of input variables. Such 
probabilistic analysis, explicitly taking into account the uncertainties associated with the 
input parameters, can offer a much better picture than a simple deterministic 
calculation. The main drawback is the much higher requirement in terms of resources 
such as time, calculating power, need to know (or to make assumptions about) material 
properties, loadings, etc. 
 
We here consider a simplified approach. Let us, for the time being, ignore the 
possibility of any crack development (growth).  
 
Let us postulate the presence of an inner surface breaking crack in the component at 
hand. The through-wall extent of such crack, a, (also called “depth” in the remainder of 
this report) is assumed to be the random variable. We use a non-dimensional measure 
of the crack depth, normalising the true depth to the component thickness. Therefore, a 
takes values in the interval (0, 1). 
 
Let us consider the following functions: 
 
• A probability distribution of flaw size, λ(a) 
• A function expressing the probability of failure as a function of flaw size, φ(a) 
• A POD curve, p(a) 
 
As the nomenclature can be confusing, it is important to note that whereas λ(a) is a 
true probability density function,  φ(a) and p(a) are not.  
 
If the functions λ(a), φ(a) and p(a) are defined, it is straightforward to calculate the 
probability of failure without inspection, pofwithout, by integrating λ(a)× φ(a) over the flaw 
size: 
 
  ∫= 1
0
)()( daaapofwithout φλ (3)
 
And, since 1-p(a) is the probability of missing a defect of size a, the probability of failure 
with inspection, pofwith, is given by: 
 
  ∫ −= 1
0
))(1)(()( daapaapofwith φλ (4)
 
Thus, the risk reduction percentage expressed in Equation 2 can be easily evaluated. 
In the following, we will use this quantity to investigate the effects of employing different 
POD curves p(a). 
 
It is important to point out the fact that the number (or frequency) of cracks has no real 
relevance in this investigation, since it would increase pofwith by the same percentage 
as pofwithout, and R would remain unchanged. 
 
In our approach, we assume that the probability of failure, φ(a), and the probability of 
detection, p(a), are functions of crack depth only. In reality, the probability of failure 
could well be dependent on crack length and other parameters, and the probability of 
detection (depending on the NDT system under consideration) would most certainly 
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 also depend on factors such as crack length, tilt, skew, as well as weld geometry, etc. 
On the other hand, it is common practice – because of great analytical simplification – 
to express the problem as a function of one parameter only, with crack depth a usually 
being the most significant one. 
 
 
3 Choice of input functions 
 
As we have seen, in our simplified model, three input functions are required. The 
probability of detection curve, p(a), can be seen as “controlled” by the user. On the 
other hand, λ(a) and φ(a) should be representative of the situation at hand. 
 
 
3.1 Flaw depth distribution, λ(a) 
 
λ(a) should represent the true crack depth distribution for the type of component and 
acting damage mechanism. A common lack of real plant data (cracks are usually 
extremely infrequent in nuclear piping) makes the choice of the appropriate distribution 
a rather difficult task. It would actually be very difficult to determine which distribution 
could appropriately model a defect population even in the case of more frequent 
defects.  
 
In this report, we will perform some analyses using the truncated exponential 
distribution. This is convenient for several reasons. First of all, the limited experience 
available [5, 6] has shown that the depth of real cracks can be modelled with an 
exponential distribution. Secondly, the distribution is defined by a single parameter 
(mathematically convenient) and it is proper in the interval [0,1] (i.e. the integral of the 
function over the interval is always equal to 1, regardless of the value taken by the 
parameter, and thus the probability distribution does not “predict” cracks that are longer 
than the thickness). Thirdly, the uniform distribution can be obtained as a special case. 
 
A truncated exponential distribution is defined by the equation below 
 
 
max
1
1
1
11)(
a
x
e
exf
µ
µ
µ −
−
−
⋅⋅=   max0 ax ≤≤
      0)( =xf maxax >
 
(5)
 
where µ is the expected value of the associated (non-truncated) exponential 
distribution, and amax defines the limit of the truncation. The expected value is given by: 
 
 
max
max
1
1
max
1
)(
a
a
e
eaxE
µ
µ
µ
−
−
−
⋅−=  (6)
 
In our case, amax=1. The uniform distribution can be obtained for ∞→µ , in which case 
E(x)=1/2. 
 
In Figure 1 are plotted some distributions obtained for different values of µ. In a realistic 
situation, we would expect the defect depth distribution to be represented by curves 
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 similar to the first 2 plotted in the Figure (µ=0.01 and µ=0.1). Using values of µ greater 
than this would seem overly conservative, but we will nonetheless also investigate the 
limiting case of ∞→µ , representing a uniform distribution of crack depths over the 
component thickness. 
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Figure 1 Truncated exponential distributions (equation 5, with amax=1) 
 
 
3.2 Probability of failure as a function of flaw size, φ(a) 
 
The function φ(a) expresses the probability of failure given that a crack of size a is 
present. It is, implicitly, a function of the material properties, the applied loading and the 
failure criteria that apply to the situation at hand.  
 
Firstly, we assume that φ(a)=0 for a=0 (quite reasonably, the probability of failure for a 
crack whose size is 0 must be zero) and that φ(a)=1 for a=1 (i.e. a failure of the 
component is assumed if the crack becomes fully penetrating, again a rather 
reasonable assumption although this excludes the possibility of leak-before-break 
considerations). 
 
For modelling convenience, we choose to represent φ(a) with the cumulative Beta 
distribution.  
 
The probability density function (pdf) of the distribution is defined on the interval [0, 1]: 
  
 11)1(
),(
1),;( −−−= αββαβα xxBxf  (7)
 
where B(x,y) is the Beta function: 
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   ∫ −− −= 1
0
11 )1(),( dtttyxB yx (8)
 
The cumulative Beta distribution function, F(x;α,β) is thus defined as: 
 
  ∫= x dttfxF
0
),;(),;( βαβα (9)
 
We choose to represent φ(a) with a cumulative Beta distribution function: 
 
 ),;(),;( βαβαφ xFx =  (10)
 
Changing the two parameters α and β allows us to obtain several different shapes that 
could conveniently represent different situations (in a simplified way). In Figure 2, three 
curves obtained using Equation 9 are plotted. The first one (solid line) is obtained for 
α=1 and β=1 and represents a situation in which the probability of failure is directly 
proportional to the flaw depth. The second one (dashed line) is obtained for α=100 and 
β=10 and represents a situation where the probability of failure is very low (virtually 
zero) for crack sizes up to approximately a=0.8, then “jumps” quickly to 1. This could be 
representative of a component which is very tolerant to the presence of crack-like 
defects, for instance because the material toughness is high. The third curve (dotted 
line) is obtained for α=10 and β=100, thus representing the opposite situation of a 
component not very tolerant to the presence of crack-like defects, for instance because 
the material toughness is low or because of the nature of the applied through-wall 
loading. 
 
See Appendix 1 for an example of how this simplified model can fit a real structural 
integrity problem. 
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Figure 2 Curves representing possible shapes of the function φ(a) 
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 3.3 Probability of detection curve, p(a) 
 
The POD curve, p(a), expresses the probability that a defect of given size a will be 
found by the inspection system. Expressing in this way the reliability of the inspection 
system is a convenient simplification for the present purposes, but it must be 
recognised that there are several other factors that in general will affect the probability 
of detection of a defect, such as defect length, tilt, skew, etc. A probability of detection 
curve is often represented as a monotonically increasing function of crack size [7], 
starting from p(a=0)=0 and rising more or less sharply to reach a plateau for crack 
depths larger than a certain value. Even if such behaviour seems intuitive (and it may 
be strictly true for some ultrasonic techniques, for instance the inspection of small 
smooth planar defects at normal angles, when the signal reflected by the crack is 
proportional to the crack area), it is important to be careful about this assumption. 
Other techniques, such as time-of-flight diffraction (TOFD) or the inspection of 
misoriented smooth cracks with conventional pulse-echo probes, rely on the 
identification of the crack edge. In such cases, a probability of detection curve plotted 
against crack depth could even show a decrease for larger cracks.  
 
In this study, we will investigate user-defined POD curves. A first convenient 
approximation is to suppose that the POD is zero for all crack sizes a below a certain 
threshold depth ath, and equal to a plateau value ppl for a > ath. In Figure 3, two such 
curves are illustrated, the first defined for ath=0.2 and ppl=0.9, and the second for 
ath=0.4 and ppl=0.8. A second type of POD curve which will be considered is only 
slightly more sophisticated, showing a sloped transition between p=0 and p=ppl (and 
thus requiring for complete definition a third parameter, apl, i.e. the crack depth at which 
p=ppl is attained). Figure 3 also includes one example of such a curve (ath=0.6, apl=0.7 
and ppl=0.7). This latter type of curve will be used to investigate the value added by 
having a slightly more informative POD curve. 
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Figure 3 User-defined probability-of-detection curves 
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4 Base cases 
 
We start by exploring some base cases. In each case, the risk reduction, R, obtained 
from Equation 2 will be calculated and plotted for several combinations of user-defined 
POD curves. Considering the generic POD step function of Figure 3, defined by the pair 
(ath, ppl), ath will be explored over its complete range [0, 1], whereas six discrete values 
(1, 0.975, 0.95, 0.9, 0.85, 0.80) will be considered for ppl. These are all cases with a 
sharp step, with no transitional region. 
 
The different cases analysed are described below, and for each the results (in terms of 
risk reduction) are reported. The cases are summarised in Table 1, and described more in 
detail below. 
 
Table 1 Summary of base cases 
Flaw depth distribution, λ(a) 
µ=0.01 µ=0.1 µ=10 
Probability of failure,
φ(a)
0 0.5 10
50
100
a
λ(a
)
0 0.5 10
5
10
15
a
λ(a
)
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1
1.5
2
a
λ(a
)
α=
1,
 β=
1 
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0.5
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a
φ(a
)
 
CASE 1a CASE 1b CASE 1c 
α=
10
, β
=1
00
 
0 0.5 10
0.5
1
a
φ(a
)
 
CASE 2a CASE 2b CASE 2c 
α=
10
0,
 β=
10
 
0 0.5 10
0.5
1
a
φ(a
)
 
CASE 3a CASE 3b CASE 3c 
 
 
CASE 1: Linear relationship between probability of failure and flaw size 
 
In this case, the probability of failure varies linearly with flaw size between 0 and 1. In 
other words, using Equation 9 with parameters α=1, β=1: 
 
 φ(x) = F(x;1,1) = x (11)
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We model λ(α) using a truncated exponential distribution as expressed in Equation 5, 
and consider three different cases for the parameter µ (0.01, 0.1 and 10), corresponding 
to three different expected values (0.01, 0.0999, 0.492). In the first 2 cases (µ=0.01, 
µ=0.1), the truncated exponential distribution virtually coincides with the non-truncated 
exponential. The third case is considered to represent a crack size distribution which is 
virtually uniform, and represents the situation of ∞→µ  (the distribution is virtually 
uniform for µ=10, and further increments of µ do not change its shape), see Figure 1. 
 
 
CASE 2: Probability of failure showing a sharp increase at a=0.1 
 
Here we consider a case in which the relationship between probability of failure and flaw 
size presents a rather sharp increase from zero to one, occurring approximately at 
a=0.1. This is obtained from Equation 9 using the parameters α=10 and β=100, see 
Figure 2. Again, we model λ(α) using a truncated exponential distribution as expressed 
in Equation 5, and consider three different cases for the parameter µ (0.01, 0.1 and 10).  
 
 
CASE 3: Probability of failure showing a sharp increase at a=0.9 
 
Here we consider a case in which the relationship between probability of failure and flaw 
size presents a rather sharp increase from zero to one, occurring approximately at 
a=0.9. This is obtained from Equation 9 using the parameters α=100 and β=10, see 
Figure 2.  
 
The figures in the following pages show the risk reduction obtained in these 9 cases, for 
the different POD curves considered. 
 
 
4.1 CASE 1a: µ=0.01, α=1, β=1 
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Figure 4 Risk reduction for case 1a and different sets of POD curves 
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4.2 CASE 1b: µ=0.1, α=1, β=1 
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Figure 5 Risk reduction for case 1b and different sets of POD curves 
 
 
4.3 CASE 1c: µ=10, α=1, β=1 
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Figure 6 Risk reduction for case 1c and different sets of POD curves 
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4.4 CASE 2a: µ=0.01, α=10, β=100 
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Figure 7 Risk reduction for case 2a and different sets of POD curves 
 
 
4.5 CASE 2b: µ=0.1, α=10, β=100 
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Figure 8 Risk reduction for case 2b and different sets of POD curves 
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4.6 CASE 2c: µ=10, α=10, β=100 
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Figure 9 Risk reduction for case 2c and different sets of POD curves 
 
 
4.7 CASE 3a: µ=0.01, α=100, β=10 
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Figure 10 Risk reduction for case 3a and different sets of POD curves 
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4.8 CASE 3b: µ=0.1, α=100, β=10 
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Figure 11 Risk reduction for case 3b and different sets of POD curves 
 
 
4.9 CASE 3c: µ=10, α=100, β=10 
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Figure 12 Risk reduction for case 3c and different sets of POD curves 
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4.10 Discussion 
 
We start this discussion by recalling that the risk reduction, as defined in Equation (2), 
expresses a percentage change from a value of risk with no inspection to a value with 
inspection. Therefore, R takes values in the interval (0,100). When R is close to 100 a 
significant risk reduction due to the inspection has been achieved. When R approaches 
zero, a small change in risk has taken place. 
 
It is clear that the information carried by R allows for a direct comparison between the 
probability of failure (and hence the risk) of a single component with and without the 
completion of an inspection. This is the goal of this study, and for this reason R has 
been so defined, but it is of some interest to consider briefly the significance of the 
absolute values of probability of failure (before doing any inspection) involved when 
moving from one situation (described by a pair of functions [λ(a), φ(a]) to another.  
 
In Figure 13, the probability of failure, calculated for the three different functions φ(a) used 
in the basic cases above, is plotted against the varying expected value, µ’, of the 
truncated exponential distribution chosen to represent the crack depth probability density. 
The parameter µ’ varies between 0 and 0.5 (when the truncated exponential becomes 
coincident with the uniform distribution). It is worth recalling that µ is the mean of the 
underlying un-truncated exponential distribution and µ’ is the mean of the truncated 
exponential distribution, given by Equation (6). 
 
It is clear that, especially for those cases when µ’ is small (which should represent real 
crack depth distributions), the absolute values obtained can vary by several order of 
magnitude from one situation to another. For instance, for µ’ = 0.05, the probability of 
failure of a situation described by a function φ(a) presenting a rapid 0-to-1 transition at 
approximately a=0.1 (red line in Figure 13, typical of a crack in a brittle material) is 107 
times higher than that of a function φ(a) presenting a similar transition at approximately 
a=0.9 (blue line, typical of a crack in a tough material). 
 
Thus, a reduction of say R=50% in the risk obtained inspecting a component 
representative of the former situation would be much more valuable than a R=50% 
reduction in the risk obtained inspecting a component representative of the latter. These 
considerations are of course the very foundation of risk-informed inspection optimisation. 
As stated, we are here only considering the analysis of the relative effect of an inspection 
system on a single component. 
 
 
CASE 1 (Probability of failure varying linearly with crack size) 
 
Figure 4 shows that if the crack depth probability distribution has a small expected 
value (µ=0.01, implying that the near totality of the probability mass is approximately 
below 4% of wall thickness), only an inspection characterised by a POD curve with an 
ath below 0.05 will be able to make any difference at all. Below this value, further 
reductions of ath will have a great effect.  
 
Figure 5 and Figure 6 show that, as the expected value of the crack depth probability 
distribution increases, the location of the POD curve step becomes more important 
even at higher values. The level of the POD plateau, ppl, also becomes important.  
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 It is interesting to note that curves such as those plotted in these figures could be used 
to make a choice on how the resources allocated to the design and qualification of an 
inspection system could be invested. Different strategies could be envisaged: 
 
• For a given, fixed ath, (which could be seen as the qualification size in the ENIQ 
methodology [8]), determine which level ppl should be used to obtain the desired 
risk reduction; 
 
• For a given, fixed ppl, determine which ath should be used to obtain the desired 
risk reduction; 
 
• A combination of the two above, maximising the risk reduction for the given 
resources (it could be the case that it is much easier – and cheaper – to push 
down ath rather than push up ppl, and still obtain the same risk reduction. 
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Figure 13 Probability of failure calculated for different functions φ(a), plotted against a 
varying expected value, µ’, of the truncated exponential distribution chosen 
to represent the crack depth probability density 
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 CASE 2 (Probability of failure increases rapidly around a = 0.1) 
 
In the second case, the probability of failure was assumed to increase rapidly for rather 
shallow cracks (a ≅ 0.1). In Case 2a (Figure 7), ath should be rather small to obtain any 
risk reduction, since the contribution of the cracks of the size just above the step in the 
failure probability function contribute the most to the failure probability. When the crack 
size distribution is assumed uniform, the risk reduction becomes linearly dependent of 
the location of ath, except for the small values below and around the step in the failure 
probability function. 
 
One should keep in mind that the failure probability function assumed for Case 2 is 
realistic mainly for very brittle materials, and such behaviour is not expected in normal 
piping systems.  
 
 
CASE 3 (Probability of failure increases rapidly around a = 0.9) 
 
Figures 10-12 show the results for the case where the probability of failure is nearly 
zero until a sharp increase when the crack depth is about 90% of the wall thickness. In 
all the analysed cases, independent of the assumption made on the initial crack depth 
distribution, the risk reduction is independent of the location of ath up to at least ath=0.6. 
The figures differ from each other only for large values of ath. The reason why in Case 
3a the drop in risk reduction occurs earlier can be explained by the fact that the 
probability of deep initial cracks is practically zero, and thus there is practically no risk 
that could be reduced. 
 
The interesting conclusion that may be drawn from Case 3, is that as long as the ath is 
within reasonable limits (and in practice detection threshold requirements are usually 
set much lower than half of the wall thickness), its exact value has no practical 
importance. The risk reduction is the same as if one had assumed a constant POD 
value equal to the plateau value ppl. If the probability of failure function is modified to 
correspond to the one in Figure 23 based on a fracture mechanistic calculation, the 
sensitivity analysis results would still lead to similar conclusions for a realistic range of 
the ath. 
 
 
5 Adding information to the POD curve 
 
In this section, we investigate the effects of adding “information” to the POD curves 
used in the analysis. In other words, we want to see the effect on the risk reduction 
introduced by POD curves which are more than a simple step function occurring at 
some crack depth ath. With reference to Figure 3, we now consider POD curves defined 
by three parameters: ath, apl and ppl.  
 
Let us define the following quantity, aav, average crack depth of ath and apl: 
 
 aav= (ath+apl)/2 (12)
 
We can imagine a family of POD curves that, given a plateau value ppl, are characterised 
by a constant value aav, see Figure 14. For any given aav, the probability of detecting a 
defect whose depth is a uniformly distributed random variable would be exactly the same 
for all curves in the family. Now we are interested to study the effect of the slope in the 
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 POD function on the risk reduction with the previously defined different assumptions 
concerning the flaw size distribution and the probability of failure as a function of flaw 
size. If we are in a situation where all POD curves of one family are equivalently 
expensive in terms of resources needed to obtain them, it becomes of interest to 
investigate how the risk reduction varies from one member to the family to another. In this 
way, it is possible to determine the optimal member of the family as the curve maximising 
the risk reduction in the situation at hand. 
 
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
ppl aav=(ath+apl)/2
athath apl apl
Relative crack depth, a
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 o
f d
et
ec
tio
n,
 p
(a
)
 
Figure 14 POD curves characterised by constant aav. 
 
In the following, we have applied this idea to base cases 1b, 2b and 3b. For clarity, only 
two plateau levels have been included (ppl=0.8 and ppl=1). Three families have then 
been considered, characterised by aav=0.25, 0.5 and 0.75. The calculated risk 
reduction is plotted in Figure 15, Figure 16 and Figure 17 versus the location of ath. For 
instance, in Figure 15, for aav=0.25 (black lines), when ath=0.25, then apl=0.25 as well, 
and we fall back to base case 1b. When ath=0, apl=0.5 and the risk reduction is greater. 
 
The way the POD curve families are defined, and considering that ath cannot be less 
than 0 nor apl more than 1, explains the ranges of the curves plotted in these figures. 
When aav=0.75, ath can take values only between 0.5 and 0.75 as apl is limited to values 
between 0.75 and 1. 
 
In cases 1b and 2b the risk reduction becomes somewhat bigger when the slope of the 
POD curve gets gentler. This is due to the fact that the inspection can then capture a 
higher portion of the small cracks which dominate the size distribution (so much that 
this dominates the result). In case 3b (except for the average at 0.25) the dominant 
factor is the loss of a part the detection efficiency for deeper cracks as the slope of the 
POD curve decreases, and thus R decreases. In the case of aav=0.25, this does not 
play a part since the sloping part of the POD curve terminates at a=0.5 or before, and 
the probability of failure curve, φ(a), only increases at around a=0.8. 
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Figure 15 Risk reduction, R, obtained for different POD curves belonging to three 
families characterised by aav=0.25, 0.5 and 0.75 (base case: 1b). 
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Figure 16 Risk reduction, R, obtained for different POD curves belonging to three 
families characterised by aav=0.25, 0.5 and 0.75 (base case: 2b). 
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Figure 17 Risk reduction, R, obtained for different POD curves belonging to three 
families characterised by aav=0.25, 0.5 and 0.75 (base case: 3b). 
 
 
A second family of POD curves that can easily be investigated is illustrated in Figure 18. 
These POD curves are characterised by a constant value apl.  
 
We applied this idea to base cases 1b, 2b and 3b. Again in the interest of clarity, only two 
plateau levels have been included (ppl=0.8 and ppl=1). Three families have then been 
considered, characterised by aav=0.25, 0.5 and 0.75. The calculated risk reduction is 
plotted in Figure 19, Figure 20 and Figure 21 versus the location of ath.  
 
In case 3b, for instance, where the transition of the function φ(a) occurs at a=0.9, there 
is absolutely no added value in “adding” the sloping part of the curve to any of the 
considered step functions. 
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Figure 18 POD curves characterised by constant apl. 
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Figure 19 Risk reduction, R, obtained for different POD curves belonging to three 
families characterised by fixed apl=0.25, 0.5 and 0.75 (base case: 1b). 
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Figure 20 Risk reduction, R, obtained for different POD curves belonging to three 
families characterised by fixed apl=0.25, 0.5 and 0.75 (base case: 2b). 
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Figure 21 Risk reduction, R, obtained for different POD curves belonging to three 
families characterised by fixed apl=0.25, 0.5 and 0.75 (base case: 3b). 
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 6 Conclusions  
 
In this document we have discussed the link between risk-informed in-service 
inspection (RI-ISI) and assumptions made concerning the probability of flaw detection. 
The purpose was to investigate which practical requirements should be set for 
assumptions about the accuracy of probability of detection (POD) curves from a RI-ISI 
point of view. 
 
We have proposed a simplified approach that allowed us to avoid making detailed 
assumptions about the relationship between crack size and probability of failure, the 
probability distribution of crack size and the shape of the POD curve. The 
determination of the two functions describing (1) failure probability as a function of flaw 
size and (2) flaw distribution would be in a real situation relatively resource-consuming 
exercises. The examples presented herein include both realistic cases and more 
extreme situations, helping to analysis the sensitivity of risk-reduction through 
inspections. 
 
The cases that most closely model a real situation are those where the expected value 
of the defect distribution is not greater than 0.1 (one tenth of wall thickness), and the 
probability of failure is very low unless the flaw depth is significant. The toughness of 
metals used in the nuclear industry would tend to exclude situations where the 
probability of failure would be high with very shallow cracks. In the realistic situations, 
the location of ath plays a rather insignificant role, unless it is unrealistically high (e.g. 
more than 70-80%,) and the risk reduction is controlled by the value of ppl. 
 
We do not draw more detailed conclusions regarding the examples at hand because the 
purpose of this report is rather to suggest a method for analysis. Each user can 
straightforwardly draw his or her own conclusions according to the input functions used. 
 
In the present study, crack growth or other time-dependent phenomena have not been 
considered. The effect of time is twofold. First, the flaw size distribution would evolve 
(flaws would initiate, other would grow to become fully penetrating, etc.). Second, the 
material properties would change, affecting the shape of the function φ(a), i.e. the 
probability of failure as a function of flaw size (see example in Appendix 1). 
 
The most important shortcoming of excluding time-related effects in the analysis is that 
we cannot presently investigate the effect of inspection intervals on risk-reduction. Future 
work will involve extending the sensitivity analyses to take into account crack growth, 
which will allow us to study various inspection strategies. One possible approach for such 
investigations is the use of Markov models. Applications of continuous-time Markov 
processes have been presented by Fleming [9], and discrete-time Markov chain studies of 
inspection strategies have been reported by Cronvall et al. [10]. In the latter approach, 
probabilistic fracture mechanics calculations are integrated with a discrete-time Markov 
process analysis to model piping degradation states at inspections, and accounting for 
flaw and leak detection probabilities. This approach seems suitable for our purposes as 
well. 
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Appendix 1 - EXAMPLE 
 
Probability of failure of cylinder under constant tension 
 
Let us consider a cylinder with an outer radius of 1m and an inner radius of 0.9m, 
subject to a constant uniform axial tension, σT, of 200 MPa. Let us assume the 
presence of a semi-elliptical inner surface-breaking crack, of depth a and length 2c. Let 
us assume that the material initiation toughness, KIC, is a normally distributed random 
variable, with mean µKIC equal to 150 MPa√m and standard deviation σKIC equal to 20 
MPa√m. Let us also assume that 2c=10a. 
 
With reference to Figure 22, the stress intensity solution at the deepest point of the 
crack, KI, is given in [A1] as:  
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Figure 22 Cylinder with semi-elliptical inner surface-breaking crack 
 
 
Let us assume the following failure criterion: 
 
  ICI KK > (A3)
 
In other words, we assume that the component has failed if the stress intensity factor at 
the crack tip exceeds the material initiation toughness.  
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Under this assumption, the probability of failure, ϕ(a), for a crack of size a can be easily 
obtained as: 
 
 ))(()(
KIC
KICI aKa σ
µϕ −Φ=  (A4)
 
where Φ(x) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. 
 
Equation (A4) is plotted in Figure 23 using the numerical data of the example. It is clear 
to see that the cumulative Beta distribution functions shown in Figure 2 are well suited 
to represent this type of behaviour. 
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Figure 23 Failure of probability versus crack size, ϕ(a), for crack in cylinder under 
constant tension 
 
Let us now suppose that the material of the component is subject to some aging-
related embrittlement. We model this by assuming that every year µKIC is reduced by 
5%, and that σKIC is reduced by 2%. In this way, σKIC becomes bigger relative to µKIC. 
These values are purely illustrative. 
 
Equation (A4) can be used again to obtain new probability of failure curves as functions 
of crack depth, for any subsequent year starting from today (Figure 24). Again, the 
cumulative Beta distribution functions shown in Figure 2 are well suited to represent 
this type of behaviour. 
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Figure 24 Failure of probability versus crack size curves (for crack in cylinder under 
constant tension), obtained assuming a progressive material embrittlement. 
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Abstract 
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assumptions made concerning the probability of flaw detection. The purpose is to 
investigate the reasonable and practical requirements that should be set for 
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